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Résumé
Cette étude a pour objectif d’identifier et analyser les e ets des décisions de politique monétaire sur l’activité économique
et l’inflation, et détermine le canal de transmission le plus opérant dans la CEMAC. Il ressort de nos résultats que : (i) la prise
en compte des pays individuellement dans un SVAR, permet de mettre en exergue une faiblesse des canaux de transmission et
une asymétrie des chocs et des délais d’action de la politique monétaire sur l’activiét. On observe une inopérabilité quasi-totale
des canaux de transmission au Congo, en Centrafrique, au Gabon, au Tchad et en Guinée Equatoriale. Par ailleurs, les chocs
sur le taux directeur et la masse monétaire n’ont de réels e ets significatifs qu’au Cameroun bien que ces e ets soient de faible
ampleur ; et (ii) la prise en compte de l’ensemble des pays dans un VAR en panel, permet de confirmer la faiblesse des canaux
de transmission dans la CEMAC. Toutefois, un choc positif sur les crdits l’économie a de faibles e ets inflationnistes pendant
trois trimestres environ.
Classification JEL : C32, E52, E58, P24
Mots cls : Politique montaire, modle SVAR, modle PVAR.
Abstract
This paper’s main objective is to analyse and identify the e ects of monetary policy decisions on activity and inflation, and
determines the main transmission channel in the CEMAC area. The results suggest that: (i) for each country, using a SVAR,
the transmission mechanisms are very weak, and the common monetary policy has asymmetrical lagged e ects on activity. We
specifically found that the transmission mechanisms barely work in Congo, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Tchad and
Equatorial Guinea, but a shock on broad money and the policy rate of the central bank has significant but weak e ects on
activity in Cameroon; and (ii) the Panel VAR analysis also confirms the weakness of the transmission mechanisms in the sub
region. However, a positive shock on credit exhibits inflationary e ects that last about three quarters.
JEL Code :C32, E52, E58, P24
Keyswords: Monetary policy, SVAR model, PVAR model.
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Non-technical summary
The present study analyses the channels through which monetary policy decisions of the
BEAC a ect the economic activity and inflation. The standard analysis of the transmission
channels generally holds that a monetary policy decision can a ect interest rates (the
interest rate channel), the stock prices or the exchange rate (asset price channel), and
amount of loans o ered by commercial banks (the credit channel). It is however possible to
identify other channels according to the complexity of the economies.
In a monetary union such as the UMAC, where the economies are not similar and thus
to some extend heterogeneous, the transmission channels and the response times of the
economies can be di erent from one country to another and generate in the same time the
ine ectiveness of the monetary policy, which would translate into asymmetric e ects on the
activity of each of the countries. Therefore, an optimal conduct of the monetary policy in a
union requires first of all a good command of the channels through which monetary policy
decisions impact the economic activity and inflation in each of countries of the union.
The objective of this paper is thus to identify the most e ective transmission channel in
the UMAC, and to derive from it the e ects of the common monetary policy on inflation
and output in the countries of the region.
Indeed, several factors may limit the action of the Central Bank in the CEMAC, making
ine ective the transmission channels of the monetary policy. These factors include: the
excess bank liquidity, the low depth of financial markets, and the dysfunctions in the banking
sector (weakness of the exchanges, concentration, restrictions on banking competition, etc.).
It was therefore necessary through an econometric approach (a SVAR model for each of
the countries, and a PVAR model for the entire region) to verify the e ectiveness of the
transmission channels in CEMAC.
The main results of our study show that:
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(i) The analysis of the countries taken individually confirms the weakness the transmis-
sion channels in the region. The obtained e ects are of small-scale and asymmetric from
one country to another. For example, in Cameroon, although the magnitude of the e ects
is slow, we notice that an increase of the TIAO (positive shock) reduces the economic
growth during approximately four (04) quarters without any significant e ects on prices.
Furthermore, a positive shock on money supply has a positive impact on the output during
approximately five (05) quarters. Concerning Congo, it appears that the shocks on credits
and money supply have no significant e ects on the economic activity and prices, but in
contrary, a positive shock on the TIAO reduces the economic growth if one considers a less
binding confidence interval (one standard deviation instead of two). Although the magnitude
of these e ects is low, it is important to mention that these findings are consistent with
the economic theory. Besides, for the CAR, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad, the
shocks on the TIAO, the money supply and the credits have no significant e ect on the
economic activity and prices. In other words, the monetary policy transmission channels are
ine ective in these countries.
(ii) When the analysis is carried out at the whole region, and not individually, we
confirm the weakness of the monetary policy transmission channels in the CEMAC. The
shocks on the money supply and the TIAO have no significant e ects on prices and output.
However, a positive shock on credits to the economy has weak inflationary e ects during
approximately three quarters, what could partially validate the credit channel despite the
low magnitude of its e ect. This result can be justified by the fact that the credits granted
by the banks in the sub-region are for the great part short-term loans. In fact, a fast increase
of short-term credits can only finance consumption and not investment and consequently,
a ect the demand increase and finally the prices.
In terms of recommendations, in front of the weakness of the transmission channels,
the action of the Central Bank can only be e ective if a set of decisions are taken, in
particular: decisions consisting in developing the financial market in CEMAC, in reducing
the bank excess of liquidity and in encouraging the granting of the medium and long-term
credits. More specifically, and without being exhaustive, it is about promoting the issuance
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of securities by States and by companies, which contribute to dry up the liquidity of banks.
Besides, the granting of medium and long-term credits requires among others, a convenient
business climate to boost the private investment. Therefore, the States should also take a
set of policy actions which are not necessarily within the scope of the Central Bank actions.
In particular, it is about the improvement of the business climate, structural reforms in the
labor market, the development of public infrastructure, the improvement of the intra-regional
trade, the strengthening of institutions, notably the legal system and the implementation of
contra-cyclical fiscal policies which are consistent with the monetary policy.
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Introduction
Identify the monetary policy transmission channels, means looking for the ways by
which the decisions of monetary policy a ects the economic activity and prices. The
e ects of monetary policy on the output has led the economists to agree on two consensus
according to which : the money has e ects on the economic activity at least in the short
run (keynesian view) and a too big increase of the money supply generates inflation in the
long run (monetarist view).
Although there is a di erence on the ways through which the money may a ect the
real-economy, most of the time, the economic theory holds that the monetary policy
decisions are transmitted on prices and output via various channels such as: the interest
rate, the share price, the exchange rate, credit, expectations, etc.
The identification of the monetary policy transmission channels allows, according to
Meltzer (1995) to determine and to master the e ects of monetary policy decisions on the
economic activity. In other words, the ignorance of these channels by the Central Bank,
or an erroneous appreciation of the latter, may explain the ine ectiveness of the monetary
policy and according to Nelson Edward (2007), is the source of the ine ectiveness of the
monetary policies of the sixties and seventies1. Furthermore, the determination of the delays
in the transmission of the monetary impulses on the economic activity allows the monetary
authority to better control its actions during the period separating the decision-making
and the moment when the e ects of these decisions become visible on the macroeconomic
variables. In fact, as stressed by Meltzer (1995), during this interlude, the pressure on the
central bank to make it give up to its rule or to change its policy is often intense.
1Nelson adds that the progress achieved by the Bank of England to understand these mechanisms, explains
the successes of the Bank’s policies.
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In a monetary union where economies are not always similar and thus heterogenous,
the transmission channels and the response time of economies can di er from a country
to another and induces at the same time the ine ectiveness of monetary policy, which
would translate into asymmetric e ects on the activity of each of the countries. Therefore,
an optimal implementation of the monetary policy in a union requires first of all a good
knowledge of the mechanisms by which the monetary policy decisions a ect the economic
activity of each of the countries of the union.
Indeed, the asymmetric reactions generated by a common monetary policy on het-
erogeneous economies, are generally translated into an acceleration of the deviation in
the cyclical and structural evolutions of economies. The consequence of the heterogeneity
can thus makes ine ective the implementation of economic policies in a monetary area,
especially as the Central Banks sometimes act without taking into account the disparity
which exist between the countries of the union (single monetary policy). However, the
existence of heterogeneities between countries does not necessarilly constitute a fate
because most of the big Central Banks are facing this this issue, as it is the case for the
European Central Bank (ECB) or the Reserv Federal Board (voir Brissimis and Delis 20102).
With regard to the cyclical and structural disparities, observed between the economies
of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), it is necessary to
look for the ways by which, the decisions of the Bank of the States of Central Africa (
BEAC), a ects the activity in the countries of CEMAC. Therefore, we seek to answer the
following question: how the decisions of monetary policy are passed on in the economy? Is
it through the interest rate (Taylor, 1995), asset prices (Tobin, 1969; Modigliani, 1971) or
then the bank credit (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Meltzer, 1995)?
To answer these questions, a meticulous analysis should be made concerning the
financial and monetary environment of the CEMAC. Indeed in the CEMAC, considering
2S.N. Brissimis and M.D. Delis (2010): "Bank Heterogeneity and Monetary Policy Transmission", ECB
working papers series N1233August 2010.
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the quasi-non-existence the direct finance, and the adoption of the fixed exchange rate3,
asset price channel (the channel of share prices and exchange rate) can turn out to be
ine ective. Furthermore, with regard to the situation of excess liquidity of the credit
institutions, which do not almost refinance themselves or little with the BEAC, it would
be vain that the interest rate channel is completely functional. It is therefore more
likely that the credit channel would be the most e ective in the CEMAC zone, and this
postulate is moreover justified in the economic literature because countries which have a
dominant banking4are more inclined to see their economic activities stimulated through the
credit channel. In contrast, countries having a very developed financial sector, are the most
exposed to the interest rate channel and the asset price channel (Hamid Davoodi et al, 2013).
The objective of this study is thus to identify the most e ective channel in the CEMAC
and deduct from it the e ects of the common monetary policy on the economic activity of
the countries of the regions.
In the remaining part of this paper, we are going to present in the first section an analysis
of the current monetary policy and the characteristics of the financial sector in CEMAC. The
second section will be devoted to a brief review of the literature while insisting on African
countries. The third section will be dedicated to the presentation of the SVAR and PAVAR
models. Finally, in the fourth section, will be presented the results, as well as the policy
recommendations.
1 Monetary policy and financial sector in CEMAC.
1.1 Evolutions of the monetary policy
Before the reforms introduced from October 16th 1990, the monetary policy of the
BEAC was based on the use of the direct instruments (preferential rates for priority sectors,
rediscount ceilings, selectivity of credits). The interest rate policy was characterized by a
3It is worth noting that the choice of the fixed exchange rate can be a structural obstacle to the monetary
policy in case of the free movement of capital. The exchange controls allow to address this constraint.
4En CEMAC, le secteur bancaire reprsente plus de 80% des actifs financiers.
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strong rigidity with regard to a very fluctuating internal and external fluctuations. The
selective credit policy did not have the expected e ect, but in contrary introduced certain
distortions at the level of resource allocation and generated a waste of monetary resources in
the public and parastatal sectors, in some national entrepreneurs and agricultural marketing
organizations. The technique of the global ceiling was partial, sti  and constituted a binding
factor for the competition between banks.
The reserve requirement policy was not advisedly used, and the constitution of reserves
appeared as a penalty for the banks, while it is an instrument of regulation of the global
liquidity of the economy. As an illustration in Gabon, during the implementation of the
1977-1979 stabilization plan, the National Monetary Committee has decided, as a penalty, to
force banks having granted credit beyond the authorized limit to hold at the Central Bank
mandatory reserves, not remunerated and equal to the amount of the noticed overtaking.
After 1990, the monetary policy of the BEAC witnessed deep changes and rest since
then on the monetary stability5. The BEAC shifted toward the use of indirect instruments,
with in particular an harmonized and more flexible policy6, the institution of monetary
programming intended to identify the states’s needs in liquidity (and no longer the bank) in
order to encourage the competition between banks, the use of the minimum reserve as an
instrument of regulation of the liquidity, and especially the setting up of a money market
in 1994, allowing an exchange of liquidity between credit institutions on one hand, and
between the latter and the BEAC on the other hand.
Concerning the minimum reserves whose the rate is di erentiated according to the level
of liquidity of countries, it should be noted that this approach is not optimal in a monetary
union and may contribute to limit the e ectiveness of monetary policy instruments. Indeed,
5That is to maintain on one hand the internal stability with a low rate of inflation (the standard in
CEMAC is 3%) and on the other hand an external stability with a su cient currency’s external coverage
rate (minimum 20%).
6The key lending rate (TIAO) of the BEAC has been modified nineteen times (19) between January 1996
and July 2009, against only seven (07) modifications before the reform by the board of directors in sixteen
years (1974-1990).
9
the minimum reserves are sometimes considered as a safety net and therefore a guarantee
for the depositors to get at least a part of their deposits back by the mean of the Central
Bank in case of bank crisis. So, to allow some banks not to constitute a minimum reserve
represents a risk in a case of emergence of a crisis. Besides, to allow some banks to constitute
the minimum reserves less than others in the same union limit the competition and at the
same time the e ectiveness of the monetary policy.
The reforms of the 90s certainly allowed the sub-region to avoid the collapse of the
financial system of the CEMAC during the crisis of the 80-90. However, from the beginning
of 2000s, one observes the excess of liquidity of the credit institutions which could limit the
e ectiveness of the transmission channels and thus the monetary policy (see Kamgna and
Ndambendia, 2008). Indeed, the bank’s excess of liquidity urges the latter to be inactive on
the money market. Banks request only very few liquid assets with the market. Furthermore,
the transactions of this market are almost always between the credit institutions of the
same group. It is one of the reason why the reform of the current monetary policy seeks to
find ways to revitalize the money market and specifically the interbank compartment. It
is however necessary to note that the low participation of banks in the interbank market
limits significantly the e ectiveness of the monetary policy and in particular the interest
rate channel (see Laurens, 2005).
As can be seen in Chart 1 below, the amounts of refinancing determined within the
framework of monetary programming are little used oscillating on average between 20
and 30% of the ceiling. In addition, there are only very few transactions in the interbank
compartment. The intermediate objective of the BEAC being to control the broad money
and credit in order to regulate the inflation, it could be di cult for central bank to achieve
its ultimate objective of price stability if this situation persists.
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Figure 1: Use of the refinancing target in CEMAC, 2002-2014 (in % of the ceiling)
Source: Authors with data from BEAC
On the other hand, the increase in government bond issuances in the sub-region, which
is also encouraged by the Central Bank, helps to reduce excess liquidity in the money
market and limit monetary financing of deficits which has an inflationary nature. Thus, in
view of their importance, the BEAC has decided7 since 2013 to accept government bonds as
collateral for refinancing of credit institutions. Indeed, banks have subscribed to securities
issued by states and generally keep them in their investment portfolio in the absence of an
active secondary market. An active secondary market would thus allow banks to invest the
securities held in their portfolios in the event of cash tension to use an existing liquidity
instead of making use of the central bank for an additional injection of liquidity into the
economy.
Indeed, in case of cash tension in a context where banks hold large amounts of government
securities, deemed to be highly liquid, they can sell them on the secondary market (to the
economic agents) in order to use an already existing liquidity and limit the inflationary
7See Decision N.04/CMP/2013 of 31 October 2013 relating to eligible financial assets as collateral for
refinancing operations at the Bank of the States of Central Africa.
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pressures that could generate an additional injection of liquidity by the Central Bank. This
could also help to enhance the e ect of the transmission channels in the sub-region.
1.2 Financial Market and Banking sector
The analysis of the banking sector and the financial market is important in this study
because the preponderance of banking sector in an economy is generally favorable to the
emergence of the credit channel. Moreover, countries with a large financial market are
generally more exposed to interest rate channel (see Mohanty and Turner, 2008).
In the CEMAC, according to the weakness of direct finance (paradoxically with two
stock exchanges whose the merging is planned8), it is obvious that the banking sector, on
which we will focus, is the most important source of financing of the economy. According to
the Banking Commission of Central Africa (COBAC)9, the banking sector holds nearly 85%
of financial assets and liabilities. And theoretically, when the banking sector is dominant in
an economy where credit is the main source of financing, monetary policy should be more
e ective.
However, the existence of a large informal sector10 is likely to depress the already
weak bank account penetration rate in CEMAC, which helps to limit the e ectiveness
of the credit channel, despite a dominant banking sector. Moreover, other factors in the
banking sector are likely to limit the e ectiveness of monetary policy in particular: the
level of competition between credit institutions and the high degree of banking concentration.
In terms of competition among credit institutions, when it is high, it significantly con-
tributes to the enhancement of the transmission channels and thus the e ectiveness of mon-
8With only three companies listed on the Douala Stock Exchange (DSX) and none in Stock Security
Exchange of Central Africa (BVMAC)
9See the COBAC 2010 report.
10As an illustration, according to the National Employment and the Informal Sector Survey (EISS) in
Cameroon conducted by the National Institute of Statistics, almost 90% of the active population works in
the informal economy. This figure has also been confirmed by the World Bank in February 2012, adding that
nearly 70% of the workforce is facing underemployment.
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Figure 2: Loans and deposits in CEMAC, 1993-2014
Source: Authors based on data of BEAC.
Note: In the left graph, data are in millions CFA francs
etary policy. In contrast, a weakly competitive banking sector limit the e ect of the action
of the central bank on the output. One of the basic measures sometimes used to analyze
the competition, is the ratio Loans/Deposits. This ratio relates the liquidity management
with the banking performance. The higher the ratio, the higher the banks grant loans from
their main source of funding (deposits), and the lower is the liquidity. However, a very high
amount of this ratio can also indicate tremendous risk exposures at the risk of borrowers
defaults. In the CEMAC, the level of banking competition is increasingly weak as evidenced
by the decline in the ratio Loans / Deposits (see the continuous line in Chart 2), which
stood at 78% in December 2014 against 110% in January 1993. An deeper analysis however
allow us to understand that the credits rationing made by banks during this period, has
significantly reduced bad debts which rose from 15% of total loans in January 1993 to 5.7%
in December 2014 (see the dashed line in chart 2).
Since the crisis of the 90s, a drop of competition is observed, which reflects the banks’
reluctance to extend credit in an environment that was characterized, before the crisis, by
large volumes of bad debts. The banks have restricted their credit supply which is less and
less important than deposits, despite the growing needs of economic agents and mainly
SMEs / SMIs which depend on bank credit. The crisis of confidence generated during this
period was gradually extended to the interbank market made up of banks less liquid than
others, to the extent that the Central Bank is obliged sometimes to inject liquid assets
in a sub-region which is globally in excess of liquidity. It would therefore be di cult for
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monetary policy to be e ective in this environment because the changes in the policy rate
can influence the excess liquidity banks credit supply policy.
Thus, to improve the e ectiveness of monetary policy, we must find measures11 allowing
to boost the granting of loans and lower lending rates12 because this will strengthen the
transmission channels of monetary policy. However, to prevent abuses like those observed in
80-90 years or during the recent financial crisis in Europe and the United States, prudential
regulation should be strengthened in CEMAC including the introduction of optimal13 ratios
that could be catalysts for the competition in CEMAC.
As for the banking concentration that is sometimes discussed as an element of compe-
tition, when it is too high, it becomes harmful to competition and thus limit the e ciency
of the transmission channels. COBAC in its various reports shows through concentration
indexes14 that the CEMAC banking sector is highly concentrated. By way of illustration,
according to the 2010 report of the COBAC, the banking system was dominated in 2010 by
foreign banks that mobilized about 63% of banking assets. Among these banks with foreign
capital, (which have a lower cost source of funding outside unlike local banks) two of them
were present in five CEMAC countries managing about one third (1/3) of resources of the
CEMAC banking sector, which currently has about fifty banks. And overall, four (04)15
financial conglomerates and groups realized most of the sub-regional financial transactions.
Moreover, Cameroon and Gabon banking systems accounted for over 80% of the CEMAC
banking market in the distribution of loans and collecting deposits. These disparities are
likely to lead to an asymmetric reaction of the economies of the CEMAC to common
11The measures to be applied to boost the granting of loans, do not fall only to the responsibility of
commercial banks, but also to the Central Bank and states. Everyone has a responsibility.
12These lending rates are high because of the business environment which is not always conducive to the
development of private investment, thus contributing to raising risk premiums charged by commercial banks.
The weight of the policy rate is very low in setting lending rates.
13As an illustration, a ratio credit / deposit best could for example be close to 100% to reduce the
indebtedness of credit institutions as well as the weight of bad loans, and at the same time encourage
competition in the banking sector.
14It generally make use of the Herfindal Hirschmann concentration index.
15Société Générale, IUB Holding, BGFI Bank and Afriland First Bank.
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monetary policy decisions.
To go further, of the 12 banks operating in Cameroon in 2010, 3 banks shared 57.6%
market share in terms of total balance sheet, 55.2% market share in terms of total deposits
and 60.7% market share in terms of total credits. In Congo, 3 of 6 banks share 86.8% market
share in terms of total balance sheet, 78.6% of deposits and 73.1% of loans. In Gabon, the
first three banks out of the 9 that counted the banking system in 2010 had 72% market
share in terms of total balance sheet, 83.6% in deposits and 87.4% in terms of credits. In
Chad, the first 3 banks on 8 in activity held respectively 71.2%, 69.7% and 68% market
share for total balance sheet, total deposits and total loans. All these trends still persist
nowaday. From this analysis, we can thus hold that in each CEMAC countries, there are
at least 3 banks whose a potential bankruptcy would entail the collapse of the financial
system of the country. This imbalance is detrimental to banking competition and therefore
limits the action of the Central Bank since the common monetary policy, when restrictive,
will be binding for the smaller banks. Moreover, in case of serious crisis, the bankruptcy
of a bank holding most of the financial assets of a country can lead to huge costs, operate
a ripple e ect on other banks and accentuate the crisis of confidence on the interbank market.
Given all the limitations mentioned above, it is not surprising that monetary policy
decisions may have little or no e ect on real activity, thus emphasizing the weakness of the
transmission channels in the area, and even if that were the case, the e ects of monetary
policy would be unbalanced from one state to another. However, a deeper analysis of the
literature is necessary for a more refined understanding of these mechanisms.
2 The transmission channels of monetary policy in developing countries: a
brief literature review
In theory, the traditional analysis of transmission channels generally holds that a
monetary policy decision can a ect interest rates (interest rate channel), the stock price, the
exchange rate (channel of prices of other assets), the amount of loans o ered by commercial
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banks (credit channel). It is possible to identify other channels depending on the complexity
of economies (see Landais, 2008). According to theoretical developments of Bernanke and
Blinder (1992) or Kierzenkowski (2004) the e ects of monetary policy on output and
prices depend on the combination of the e ects of three traditional channels: interest rate,
credit and exchange rate. In other words, the responses of output and prices to monetary
policy shocks will be amplified or diminished according to intensity of the response of the
money demand to changes in interest rates, according to the response of credits or that of
the exchange rate. Several channels can thus coexist with di erent magnitudes in an economy.
Indeed, the transmission channels of monetary policy are not fixed, and di er mostly
from one country to another depending on the importance of the banking sector, the depth
of the financial sector but also the reforms undertaken by the states16.
Regarding developing countries, Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo (2010) showed that
the transmission mechanisms in low-income countries are fundamentally di erent from those
of countries with sophisticated financial sectors. According to these authors, the traditional
mechanisms of transmission of monetary policy would be weak and sometimes ine ective in
low income countries because of the weakness of the institutional framework, the imperfect
competition in the banking sector, embryonic financial markets and the high costs of bank
loans.
Like the work of Romer and Romer (1989), other studies have focused on a narrative
approach to show that the transmission mechanisms are not always weak in developing
countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa . Berg et al. (2013) show in this regard
that the use of very sophisticated models17 may underestimate the weight of some channels
in the transmission of monetary policy. The authors illustrate by the narrative approach
that traditional channels are operative in some countries of East Africa such as Kenya,
16See Prachi Mishra and Peter Montiel (2012) for a survey of empirical studies on the transmission channels
in low income countries
17It is for example the case of VAR, SVAR or VECM models.
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Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda.
Davoodi et al. (2013) wrong-foot this analysis and show that these channels are weak
when using standard statistical inferences. Thus, using the Bayesian VAR and FAVAR, they
highlighted the channel of interest rates, credit and foreign exchange rates in East African
countries, stating that the rate channel seems more relevant in countries with a significant
depth of financial markets.
In the CEMAC zone, studies were conducted to analyze the e ectiveness of the monetary
policy of the Central Bank in a context of excess liquidity of banks and thus analyze the
e ectiveness of the transmission channels of monetary policy. Saxegaard (2006) and uses
a threshold VAR model to highlight non-linearities in the transmission of monetary
policy in the CEMAC zone, Nigeria and Uganda. According to this author one must
first distinguish involuntary excess liquidity from the excess liquidity for precautionary
purposes. He shows that the transmission of monetary policy to the output is weak when
the involuntary liquidity is high (from 2000s in CEMAC). However, according to the author,
the transmission of monetary policy on prices would be weak in Nigeria and Uganda when
the involuntary liquidity held by banks is high. CEMAC, in contrary, he found that even
when liquidity is not too high, the transmission remains weak. This situation highlights
the existence of other factors that may induce weak transmission channels outside the
situation of voluntary or involuntary liquidity of banks. In other words, the excess liquidity is
not the only factor that may limit the e ciency of the transmission channels in the CEMAC.
Kamgna and Ndambendia (2008) also show that the excess liquidity of banks in the
CEMAC zone significantly limits the e ectiveness of monetary policy. This ine ciency is
related, according to these authors, to a low sensitivity of the interbank rate to monetary
policy decisions and ine ective reserve requirement policy.
Very few studies focus on the most relevant channel in sub-Saharan Africa and par-
ticularly in CEMAC. However, concerning for example the interest rate channel, Fielding
(1994) showed that in Cameroon, the elasticity of interest rates relative to the money
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demand is much lower than in countries such as Nigeria , Ivory Coast and Kenya where
financial markets although embryonic, are more developed than in CEMAC zone. Indeed,
the strength of this channel depends on two sensitivities: firstly, the intensity of the response
of interest rates to changes in the money supply, and secondly, the intensity of the response
of the aggregate money demand to changes in key interest rates. In other words, the rate
channel would operate less well in Cameroon than in Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Kenya.
Nubukpo (2007) has highlighted the channel of interest rates in the UEMOA zone, although
its magnitude is low according to the author. In the CEMAC, in contrary studies have
confirmed the stability of the money demand function and thus a certain homogeneity of
behavior between Cameroon and other countries in the region (see MOUNKALA, 2012)
and, with reference to studies of Fieldings (1994) and Nubukpo (2007), it is di cult that the
interest rate channel may be operating in the CEMAC, and even if it does, its e ectiveness
will inevitably be reduced and lower than in the UEMOA zone with regard to di erences in
the depth of financial markets.
Mixed results have been found in other sub-Saharan countries about the channel
rate through sometimes distinct approaches. These studies argue (i) sometimes to an
e ectiveness if the interest rate channel like Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) for Namibia, Cheng
(2006) for Kenya and Ogunkula TARAWALIE (2008) for Sierra Leone (ii) sometimes
ine ectiveness for that channel like Abradu-Otoo Amoah and Bawumia (2003) for Ghana,
Buigut (2009) for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda or Ramcharan (2010 ) for Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia and Malawi. Studies also show limited e ects of this channel like
Sexegaard (2006) for CEMAC, Lungu (2008) for Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa
and Zambia (see Davoodi, Dixit and Pinter, 2012; Montiel, AdamMboe and O’Connel, 2012).
As for the credit channel, it is generally accepted that countries with predominant
banking sectors are more exposed to this channel. As such, Creel and Levasseur (2006) have
shown for some countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that the dependence of
economic agents in the banking sector for consumption spending and investment, result in a
credit channel which is more e ective than in the countries of the euro area where the rate
channel appears operational due to a relatively developed financial market (see also Ganev
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et al, 2002; European Central Bank, 2002; Angeloni et al, 2003). According to this school
of thought and in line with the work of Davoodi et al. (2013) for East African countries,
monetary policy will have a greater impact on spending of small and medium enterprises,
which are more dependent on bank credit than large companies that have direct access to
capital markets. Therefore, in market economies, where banks play a less important role in
credit markets, the bank lending channel is less e ective (see also Edwards and Mishkin
1995).
Thus, given the non-expansion of the direct finance in CEMAC, the credit channel is
more likely to occur in the area because almost all businesses operating in the formal sector
use banks for their financing needs.
Overall, a good command of the transmission channels of the monetary authorities, al-
lows them to better understand the impact of their decisions on the economy, mainly the
production and prices of each country. In a currency area and heterogeneous as CEMAC,
the good command of these channels is an asset to analyze the e ectiveness of the monetary
policy of the BEAC as well as the orientation to be given to future monetary impulses.
3 Empirical evaluation of the money-output link in a SVAR model
3.1 The models used to analyze the money-output relationship
It is worth mentioning that there are di erent models used to assess the impact of
monetary policy on economic activity. The existence of these models can be explained
largely by the Keynesian-classical cleavage. However, a consensus exists: there is a strong
correlation between money and prices over the long term. In the short term however, things
get complicated and methods follow one another.
We thus shifted from the St. Louis equations18 (which just required the past series) to
error correction models. But these models have encountered the Lucas critique that under
18Referring to the Federal Reserve (FED) of Saint Louis.
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rational expectations, coe cients of such models are not always stable. And furthermore,
these models (especially that of St. Louis) did not take into account the possible twoway
causality between variables (King and Plosser 1984).
Another method is to construct theoretical macroeconomic models (see Lavigne and Vil-
lieu, 1996). These models are used to determine di erent elasticities with proven robustness.
However, when the model specification di ers, it is di cult to compare countries to each
other through such models (see Coudert and Mojon, 1997) and furthermore, the elasticities
are sometimes overestimated due to restrictions imposed a priori. Romer and Romer (1990),
introduced models based on a qualitative and institutional design of monetary policy: for
example, they take into account the minutes of the meetings of monetary policy committees
and analyze reports. However, for Hoover and Penz (1994), this method su ers from the
mistake of assimilation between precedence and causality.
VAR models, widely used in today’s economy, have emerged and popularized in the 1980s
by Sims, notably following the Lucas critique, and taking into account in some equations
of rational expectations. However, the peculiarity of the structural VAR models that we
use in this paper, is that one imposes constraints extracted from economic theory in the
considered VAR. However, following Sims (1980), works as part of the VAR methodology
and its variants will succeed in an attempt to prove or disprove a monetary explanation
of economic fluctuations (Bernanke, 1986; Blanchard and Watson, 1986; Blanchard, 1989;
Blanchard and Quah, 1989).
In the context of monetary unions, a more recent approach is to use panel VAR models.
Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) make a comprehensive survey of this methodology. However, an-
other more complex method and initiated by the economists of the real business cycle theory
is increasingly used today in central banks: these are dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models abbreviated DSGE (see Woodford 2003; Smets and Wouters, 2003; Shanaka Peiris
and Saxegaard, 2007).
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3.2 Presentation of the SVAR model
The structural VAR models (SVAR) were introduced in the mid-eighties to meet the crit-
icisms19 of the unconstrained VAR models to analyze the impulse response along the lines
recommended by Sims (1980). Indeed, as Sims points out, if the shocks in a VAR are not
independent, one performs a ?statistical? orthogonalization through a variance decomposi-
tion or Choleski decomposition. However, no economic interpretation is possible with such a
method. Authors such as Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989), King et
al (1991) therefore proposed to identify the economically interpretable structural impulses
response. However, in our case, the VAR used has the following form:
A0Xt =
pÿ
i=1
AiXt≠i + Át, t = 1, ..., T (1)
Where Xt = (X1t, X2t, ..., Xnt)Õ represents a vector of n variables at each time t. In our
case, we have five variables of the real and monetary area for each country over the period
1998-2008 in quarterly data. The variables taken into account are as follows: GDP, the
consumer prices index (CPI), the broad money (M2), credits to the economy (CE), the
central bank rate (Tiao). Only the GDP was transformed from annual to quarterly data
following the procedure of Goldstein and Khan (1976).
As regards the number of selected variables, note that Stock and Watson (2001) show
that a VAR with a low number of variables (two or three) often leads to unstable estimates,
moreover, a very large number of variables reduces the degree of freedom and increases
volatility. In expression (1), Át is a vector of structural shocks, the Ai are square matrices of
order n such that:
Át = (Á1t, Á2t, ..., Ánt)Õ and Ai =
Qcccccccccccca
ai11 . . . a
i
1n
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
ain1 . . . a
i
nn
Rddddddddddddb
19Particularly that related to the lack of theoretical foundation in the use of such models
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The VAR represented by equation (1) is called structural VAR if we assume that the
structural shocks are orthogonal (that is to say, the variance-covariance matrix of the error
term is diagonal). It is thus obvious that if the Ai matrices are known, we can calculate
the e ect of a shock of a variable in the financial sphere, on a variable of the real sphere,
particularly the e ect of a monetary shock on production or prices. For this purpose,
one must write the first relationship in the form of a VMA(Œ), It is a moving average
specification (Moving Average) and Wold decomposition, which is made as follows :
A0Xt = A(L)Xt + Át
From where
Xt = (A0 ≠ A(L))≠1Át
Qcccccccccccca
X1t
.
.
.
Xnt
Rddddddddddddb
=
Œÿ
i=0
=
Qcccccccccccca
Ci11 . . . C
i
1n
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Cin1 . . . C
i
nn
Rddddddddddddb
Qcccccccccccca
Á1t
.
.
.
Ánt
Rddddddddddddb
(2)
or
Xt =
Œq
i=0
ChÁt≠h
Xt = C(L)Át (3)
We can therefore measure the impact of the monetary sphere of the real economy using
dynamic multipliers:
ˆXit
ˆÁjs
= Cijs
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This is an impulse response function because ’ the horizon, h Ø 0, h æ Cijs,h
However, to characterize the system’s responses to structural impulses (ujs), we will iden-
tify the structural dynamic multipliers ( ij,t≠s) from the following moving average process:
Xt =
Œÿ
i=0
(ChA0)(A≠10 Át≠h) (4)
Xt =
Œÿ
i=0
( h)(ut≠h) (5)
where  h = ChA0 and ut≠h = A≠10 Át≠h
Thus we derive the dynamic multiplier by:
ˆXit
ˆu =  ijs
Our results will therefore be presented as graphic and structural responses will be as: ’
the horizon, h Ø 0, h æ  ijs
However, the impulse responses can also be analyzed with the study of the variance
decomposition of the forecast error of each series according to the principles of Sims (1980).
Moreover, not knowing the elements of the matrices Ai, we first estimate the reduced form
of expression (1) which is as follows:
A0Xt =
pÿ
i=1
BiXt≠1 + ut (6)
where Bi = A≠10 Ai
The error terms u1t, (u2t, u3t, ..., unt)Õ are only residuals and represent linear combinations
of the structural shocks. Indeed, ut = A≠10 Át.
However, the estimate of the VAR of the reduced form does not allow us to identify
all the elements of the matrix A0 and those of the variance-covariance matrix of structural
shocks. Indeed, the variance-covariance matrix qu is :
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ÿ
u = A≠10
ÿ
Á(A≠10 )Õ (7)
We therefore have (n2 ≠ n) ◊ 2 parameters to be identified which gives a total of forty
since we have twenty (n2 ≠ n) unknown in each of matricesA0 and qu.
Yet, the variance-covariance matrix estimated from the reduced form only provides us
fifteen ((n2≠n)(n≠1))/2 non-identical values as by construction, this matrix is symmetrical.
So we have a problem of identification in Equation 7 because we have more unknowns n2
than equations (n(n ≠ 1)/2. To solve it, we need additional identification assumptions and
a total of 10 (n(n≠ 1)/2 additional restrictions.
These assumptions are often drawn from the economic theory unlike unconstrained VAR
popularized by Sims (1980), which instead uses Cholesky decomposition which consist in
forcing the matrix qu to be diagonal and standardizing to 1 the main diagonal of the matrix
A0 and to impose an upper or lower triangular structure so that:
q
u = A0AÕ0
Such that q u = Idn
However, there are two additional possibilities:
1. One can apply for short-term constraints on the A0 matrix that binds current shocks;
2. One can apply long-run constraints on the matrix of the long-term multipliers defined
in the moving average representation.
Most constraints, particularly those of the short-term, correspond to a number of
null coe cients. In contrast, the long term constraints are introduced in the case of
non-stationary processes and in the usual manner, a long-term constraint expresses the
absence of a long-term response of a component of X to any impulse, and is reflected
by the nullity of the corresponding coe cient. These long-term constraints were initiated
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by Blanchard and Quah (1989). However, it is possible to make a mixture of the two
possibilities to obtain the desired number of constraints.
In our case and for each country, the vector Xt is respectively made up of GDP, CPI,
the EC, TIAO, and M2. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) we apply
short-term constraints on A0 so that this matrix is triangular. Which is to say that the
variables do not instantaneously respond to economic policy shocks. The cause of this lack
of response in the short term, is due to the adjustment phenomena that are usually slow
with the existence of nominal rigidities20, the existence of possible delays in response.
After estimating for each country, a SVAR model, the same exercise will be done on a
panel data model composed of the six CEMAC States. We estimate for the whole area, a
panel SVAR model inspired from the work of Goodhart and Hofmann (2008). The approach
is similar to that of SVAR, but an individual dimension is added to the model (For more
details see Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013).
4 Results, interpretations and monetary policy recommendations
4.1 Results and interpretations
Stationarity of variables
We used growth rate for GDP, CPI, credit to the economy and the money supply. Only
TIAO is taken in logarithm. Stationarity tests show that:
1. In the individual analysis, the TIAO is integrated of order 1, the other variables are
stationary except GDP in CAR which is integrated of order 1;
2. For the panel analysis, only the TIAO is integrated of order 1
20The explanation for these nominal rigidities is exposed in the theory of menu costs. See Blanchard and
Kiotaky (1987).
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Country analysis
Overall, SVARs applied by countries confirms the weakness of the transmission chan-
nels of monetary policy in CEMAC (see impulse response functions by country in appendix).
The obtained e ects are weak and asymmetric from one country to another. Regarding
the Cameroon example, although the magnitude of the e ect is small, however, we note
that a positive shock on TIAO depresses economic growth during approximately four (04)
quarters, without any significant e ect on prices. In addition, a positive impact on the
money supply has a positive impact on the output for about five (05) quarters. It should
nevertheless be noted that, with regard to the interconnection of some credit institutions
in the sub-region, the loans granted by the Cameroonian banks can finance the activities
of other CEMAC countries; which would in such circumstances would allow to convey the
e ects of the interest rate channel in other countries.
For Congo, it appears that the shocks on credit and money have no significant e ects
on real activity and prices but rather, a positive impact on the TIAO depresses growth
considering a confidence interval of one (01) standard deviation instead of two (02).
Although the magnitude of these e ects is low, it must still be noted that this is consistent
with economic theory.
Besides, for CAR, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad, the shocks on TIAO, money
supply and credit have no significant e ect on output and prices. In other words, the
transmission channels of monetary policy are totally ine ective in these countries.
Indeed, asymmetric shocks observed in the sub-region, are consistent with results of
Keynesian-inspired models (Clarida et al, 1999; Karras, 2007; Alfonso and Furceri, 2008)
according to which the main disadvantage of monetary union between di erent countries is
the importance of asymmetric shocks. Using a model SVAR, Fielding and Shields (2001) were
also interested in the case of countries of the CFA franc zone and showed that only the price
shocks are converging in these countries because of the use of a common monetary policy.
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However, Tapsoba (2009) assessed the size of asymmetries shock of output in di erent unions
and it shows that the proportion of asymmetric shocks in GDP growth rate is for example
71% for CEMAC, 74% for COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa),
87% for ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), 81% for the UEMOA
(Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa), and 71% for AMU (Arab Maghreb Union).
These asymmetries are due to the heterogeneity observed in these areas.
Panel data analysis
The results of the panel VAR model allow to conclude with certainty to the weakness
of transmission channels in the CEMAC. Indeed, as can be seen in the impulse response
functions below, the shocks on the TIAO and money supply do not have a significant e ect on
output and prices. However, a positive impact on credit to the economy has weak inflationary
e ects during approximately three quarters in the CEMAC, what could partially validate
the credit channel despite the weakness of its magnitude. This can be justified by the nature
of credits granted by banks of the sub-region which are generally of short term. In other
words, a rapid increase in short-term loans can only finance consumption, not investment,
and consequently, increase demand and ultimately prices.
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Figure	3	–	impulse	response	functions	of	the	response	of	GDP	(GPIB)	and	Price	(GIPC)	to	the	
positive	shocks	on	credits	(Shock	3),	on	money	supply	(Shock	4),	and	on	the	interest	rate	
(Shock	5).  
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4.2 Monetary policy recommendations
As a recommendation, it should be emphasized that the inoperability of the interest
rate channel reveals dysfunctions in the financial market (still embryonic in the CEMAC)
and the money market, particularly in the area of BEAC interventions primarily due to
the excess liquidity of banks. Certainly, the credit channel seems to be operating, but its
e ectiveness is reduced by the credit crunch and the nature of credits that are mostly of
short term.
Measures consisting of developing the financial market in the CEMAC, to reabsorb
the liquidity of banks and to encourage the granting of medium- and long-term credit
should be taken, in particular by promoting the issuance of securities by the states and by
companies21. These securities that banks and other market participants can acquire on their
behalf and on behalf of economic agents will use the existing liquidity, but also explore the
benefits of market finance.
It is also necessary to remove the remuneration of required reserves as in many Central
Banks and possibly raise the reserve requirement ratio which should also be harmonized
within the CEMAC to encourage competition between banks.
BEAC is also expected to provide financial institutions with reliable information, which
may boost the credit. These include the central payment incidents, the central balance
sheets, and credit reporting agencies.
However, stimulation of medium and long-term credit requires a business environment
that is conducive to private investment. Other measures can be taken, but that does not
necessarily fall under the action of the Central Bank, these include improving the business
21This can be made possible by accelerating the process of merging the two financial markets in the
sub-region, and encouraging companies to use capital markets. Certainly BEAC already accept government
securities to refinance, but it should push the envelope further by also accepting securities issued by companies
with a good rating on markets. It therefore requires the rapid establishment of Negotiable Debt Securities
(TCN) representing collateral likely to restore confidence between banks.
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climate, structural reforms in the labor market, the development of infrastructure, improv-
ing intra-regional trade, the strengthening of institutions and particularly the judiciary, the
establishment of countercyclical fiscal policies, consistent with monetary policy. These mea-
sures are the responsibility of States, but limit the transmission channels of monetary policy
while conditioning the e ectiveness of the latter.
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Conclusion
This study aimed to identify the most operating channel in the CEMAC, and to derive
the e ects of monetary policy on the output of the economies of the region through a
SVAR model by country incorporating nominal rigidities inspired by the work of Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), then a SPVAR covering the six CEMAC countries and
inspired by the work of Goodhart and Hofmann (2008).
It is clear from our analysis that the credit channel seems to be the more e ective22 but
its e ectiveness is still impaired by the credit rationing operated by banks in a paradoxical
context of excess liquidity, and the nature of the loans which are generally of short term. On
the other hand, countries in the region, react asymmetrically to common shocks of monetary
policy, this situation highlights the heterogeneity of the economies in the sub-region.
Overall, monetary policy has asymmetric and disproportionate impact from one state to
another in the area and the transmission channels of monetary policy are almost ine ective.
It should therefore be advisable to put in place more structural measures that would help
make more symmetric e ects of monetary policy on each country, while absorbing the high
liquidity in the CEMAC and pushing to the granting of loans. These measures not only fall
under the responsibility of monetary authorities, but also of governments.
22The credit channel positively impacts output in some countries (Congo, CAR, Chad) and on prices for
other countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea)
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Appendix
	
Figure 4 : Impulse response functions of Cameroon to credit shocks, broad money and interest rates 
(Shock 3= positive shock on credit; Shock 4=positive shock on the Money Supply; Shock 5=positive 
shock on TIAO).  
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Source : Authors based on Eviews 
Figure 5 : Impulse response functions of Congo to credit shocks, broad money and interest rates 
(Shock 3= positive shock on credit; Shock 4=positive shock on the Money Supply; Shock 5=positive 
shock on TIAO).  
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Source : Authors based on Eviews 39
	Figure 6 : Impulse response functions of Gabon to credit shocks, broad money and interest rates 
(Shock 3= positive shock on credit; Shock 4=positive shock on the Money Supply; Shock 5=positive 
shock on TIAO).  
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Source : Authors based on Eviews 
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	Figure 7 : Impulse response functions of Equatorial Guinea to credit shocks, broad money and interest 
rates (Shock 3= Positive shock on credit ; 4=Shock positive shock on the broad money; Shock 5=Positive 
shock on TIAO).  
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Source : Authors based on Eviews 
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 Figure 8 : Impulse response functions of RCA to credit shocks, broad money and 
interest rates (Shock 3= Positive shock on credit ; 4=Shock positive shock on the 
broad money; Shock 5=Positive shock on TIAO).  
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Source : Authors based on Eviews	
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Figure 9 : Impulse response functions of Chad to credit shocks, broad money and interest rates 
(Shock 3= Positive shock on credit ; 4=Shock positive shock on the broad money; Shock 5=Positive 
shock on TIAO).  
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